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Gendering French in Tunisia: language 
ideologies and nationalism*
Keith Walters
Abstract
This paper seeks to describe and account for a common ideology among Tuni-
sians and North Africans more broadly that associates the use of French with 
women, thereby symbolically associating the use of Arabic with men. In this 
regard, the use of French can be said to be “gendered” there. In an effort to 
historicize this phenomenon, I sketch the social history of French in Tunisia, 
particularly in regards to the access female and male Tunisians would histori-
cally have had to it through the institution of schooling. I then consider the 
different relationships contemporary Tunisian men and women have with 
French. Finally, I seek to contextualize these relationships in light of other 
ideologies that are part of Tunisian daily life, particularly notions of “authen-
ticity” and “openness”, tropes of many forms of discourse in Tunisia.
Keywords: Tunisia; gender; ideology; Arabic; French; social history of 
l anguage.
A	woman	from	La	Marsa	went	to	the	dentist	with	
a	cavity.	When	he	told	her	that	he	was	going	to	
have	 to	give	her	a	 local	anesthetic,	 she	 replied,	
“Don’t	you	have	anything	imported?”
1.	 Introduction
This	joke,	which	circulated	widely	in	Tunisia	in	the	mid-1980s,	functioned	as	
a	form	of	social	critique	then,	as	it	would	today	(cf.	Sherzer	2002).1	I	heard	it	
multiple	times,	told	always	by	a	man.	(I,	too,	am	a	man,	and	it	is	important	to	
acknowledge	homosocial	patterns	of	verbal	and	social	 interaction,	 including	
joke	telling,	both	in	the	Arab	world	and	in	the	West.)	Each	time	I	heard	the	
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joke,	the	teller	codeswitched.	Such	Arabic/ French	codeswitching	is	common	
among	Tunisians,	especially	educated	ones;	in	fact,	it	is	constitutive	of	Tunisi-
anness	in	crucial	ways.	The	teller	always	began	in	Tunisian	Arabic	but	switched	
to	French	for	the	noun	phrase	“local	anesthetic”	before	switching	back	to	Ara-
bic	and	then	switching	again	to	French	for	“imported”	—	the	final	word	of	the	
joke’s	punch	line	and	thus	a	rhetorically	marked	structural	position.2
In	retelling	the	joke,	most	tellers	used	the	French	name	of	the	town	of	La	
Marsa,	historically	the	most	affluent	of	the	northern	Tunis	suburbs	along	the	
Mediterranean	coast	and	still	the	most	chic	among	them.	A	few	used	its	Arabic	
name,	 [ḷ-marsa],	 the	 pronunciation	 of	al-marsa	 in	Tunisian	Arabic.	Among	
those	who	used	 the	French	version	of	 the	 town’s	name,	some	rendered	 it	 in	
what	we	might	 term	 “North	African	 French”,	 crucially	 using	 an	 apical	 [r].	
O	thers	pronounced	the	name	in	a	way	that	approximated	or	was	identical	to	
what	we	would	expect	from	a	native	speaker	of	Standard	French,	including	use	
of	the	uvular	[ᴚ].3	(Importantly,	because	both	of	these	sounds	are	phonemic	in	
Arabic,	all	Tunisians	can	articulate	both	with	equal	ease.	Therefore,	any	differ-
ences	in	choice	of	r-variant	cannot	be	linked	to	ability.)
Some	 aspects	 of	 the	 joke’s	 social	 critique	 are	 quite	 obvious	while	 others	
emerge	only	in	the	context	of	local	knowledge.	A	non-Tunisian	can	correctly	
guess	that	conflicts	at	play	include	those	related	to	class	and	perhaps	region	as	
well	as	what	some	might	term	authenticity	—	the	local	versus	the	non-local,	
self	versus	other.	Those	with	a	knowledge	of	recent	Tunisian	history	would	be	
aware	that	during	this	period,	the	last	years	of	the	rule	of	Habib	Bourguiba,	the	
“father”	 of	 the	 country,	 the	 “Supreme	 Combatant”,	 and	 its	 first	 president	
(1956 –1987),	the	Tunisian	economy	was	in	peril,	and	few	goods	of	any	kind	
were	imported.	Hence,	access	to	them	represented	a	particular	mark	of	distinc-
tion	(Bourdieu	1987).
How	can	we	understand	this	joke	in	the	contexts	in	which	it	was	told	and	
retold?	What	can	it	teach	us	about	language	in	Tunisia	and	more	particularly	
language	and	gender	and	even	much	more	abstract	 issues	 like	 language	and	
nationalism?	In	this	article,	I	seek	to	address	these	issues	by	considering	three	
topics.	First,	I	review	what	is	known	about	how	French	came	to	be	in	Tunisia	
and	widely	used	there.	Second,	I	examine	how	the	speaking	of	French	is	“gen-
dered”,	that	is	the	ways	in	which	Tunisian	women	and	men	have	and	have	had	
different	relationships	with	French	—	its	acquisition,	norms	of	use	(especially	
with	respect	to	accent),	and	motivations	for	its	use.	Finally,	I	examine	the	lin-
guistic	ideologies	that	have	arisen	among	Tunisians	about	French,	its	utility,	
and	its	functions	in	creating	Tunisian	national	identity.
Throughout	I	am	concerned	with	two	aspects	of	language	ideologies:	first,	
the	complex	ways	they	are	linked	to	ideologies	about	other	social	constructs	
(e.g.,	 gender,	 nationalism,	 and	 the	 links	 between	 them)	 and,	 second,	 their	
e	verydayness,	particularly	the	ways	they	are	reinscribed	in	countless	mundane	
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forms	such	a	jokes,	proverbs,	or	often-repeated	quips	and	taken	as	representa-
tions,	however	problematic,	of	social	reality.	Following	Irvine,	I	take	language	
ideologies	to	be	“the	cultural	system	of	ideas	about	social	and	linguistic	rela-
tionships,	together	with	their	loading	of	moral	and	political	interests”	(Irvine	
1989:	285).	An	understanding	of	such	 ideologies	 is	crucial	 to	 the	project	of	
sociolinguistics	and	linguistic	anthropology	because,	as	Kroskrity	aptly	stated,	
“a	group’s	beliefs	about	language,	often	unexamined	beliefs	at	that,	are	typi-
cally	at	the	heart	of	its	sense	of	group	identity”	(Kroskrity	2004:	511).	Hence,	
in	explicating	ideologies,	we	are	able	to	understand	the	constitutive	roles	lan-
guage	plays	in	the	identity	of	social	groups,	here,	Tunisians,	and	more	particu-
larly,	Tunisians	as	men	or	women,	as	we	gain	insight	into	important	aspects	of	
Tunisian	culture.
2.	 The	linguistic	situation	in	contemporary	Tunisia	and	the	role	of	
French	there
Tunisia	 is	 the	most	 ethnically	 and	 religiously	 homogeneous	 country	 of	 the	
Arab	world.	Well	over	99%	of	the	native-born	population	is	Muslim,	and	over	
98%	of	 the	native-born	population	identifies	as	Arab.	While	a	few	thousand	
foreigners,	 most	 of	 European	 origin,	 and	 some	 immigrants	—	 many	 from	
North	Africa	and	an	increasing	number	from	south	of	the	Sahara	—	live	there,	
one	also	finds	a	small	number	of	native	Tunisians	who	would	identify	as	Ber-
ber,	most	living	on	the	island	of	Djerba	or	in	the	far	south	of	the	country,	al-
though	we	have	no	way	of	knowing	how	many	of	these	Tunisians	might	speak	
a	variety	of	 their	 heritage	 language.	 (Berber	was,	 of	 course,	 the	 indigenous	
language	of	North	Africa	prior	 to	 the	arrival	of	 the	Phoenicians.)	There	are	
very	few	monolingual	speakers	of	Berber,	especially	among	younger	people,	
and	any	older	monolingual	speakers	are	almost	assuredly	women,	adult	men	
having	 learned	Tunisian	Arabic	 as	 their	 daily	 lives	brought	 them	 in	 contact	
with	 speakers	 of	 the	 language.	 There	 are	 also	 several	 very	 small	 Jewish	
c	ommunities	—	again,	on	 the	 island	of	Djerba,	 in	Tunis,	and	 in	one	or	 two	
other	of	the	country’s	smaller	cities	—	with	a	unique	confessional	or	commu-
nal	dialect	of	Tunisian	Arabic	(Walters	2006).	As	explained	below,	the	fact	that	
Tunisia	has	no	sizable	social	minorities,	particularly	minorities	whose	identity	
is	 indexed	 by	 a	 language	 other	 than	Tunisian	Arabic,	 helps	 distinguish	 the	
country	from	its	Maghrebian	neighbors,	Algeria	and	Morocco,	both	of	which	
have	large	minorities	whose	native	language	is	some	variety	of	Berber.
Despite	this	social	homogeneity,	one	finds	great	linguistic	diversity.	My	ef-
forts	to	represent	the	broadest	outlines	of	that	diversity	can	be	found	in	Figure	
1,	 a	 schematic	diagram	of	 the	Tunisian	 linguistic	 situation	 focusing	on	 lan-
guages,	 language	varieties,	and	language	practices	generally	associated	with	
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Figure	1.	 Schematic representation of the Tunisian linguistic situation ( Walters 1996: 528)
Gendering French in Tunisia	 87
language	contact.	In	this	article,	my	focus	is	French	and	particularly	its	com-
plex	links	to	Tunisian	ideologies	of	gender	and	of	nationalism.	I	contend	ulti-
mately	that	only	by	studying	the	situation	of	French	in	Tunisia	can	we	under-
stand	the	situation	of	Arabic	or	other	languages	there.	By	extension,	given	the	
multilingual	 nature	 of	 all	 countries	 of	 the	modern	Arab	world,	 an	 adequate	
understanding	of	them	—	or	of	the	role	of	Arabic	in	them	—	depends	on	think-
ing	relationally,	i.e.,	understanding	how	the	languages	and	language	varieties	
used	in	each	country	relate	to	one	another.
Such	a	move	runs	contrary	to	much	work	on	the	region,	where	the	research	
literature	generally	treats	each	language	hermetically,	as	if	it	existed	in	isola-
tion.	One	category	of	exception	here	would	be	research,	often	pedagogical	in	
nature,	that	focuses	on	interference	from	one	of	the	languages	present	on	the	
other,	e.g.,	Brahim’s	(1994)	treatment	of	errors	in	the	French	of	Tunisian	uni-
versity	students.	Working	within	the	norm-and-deviation	paradigm	that	con-
tinues	to	characterize	the	teaching	of	standardized	languages,	Brahim	did	not	
consider	 the	 possibility	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 conventionalized	 way	 of	 using	
French	structurally	influenced	by	knowledge	of	Arabic	that	has	come	to	index	
North	Africanness.	From	this	perspective	and	in	light	of	the	research	on	lan-
guage	contact,	much	of	what	Brahim	analyzes	can	be	seen	as	an	emerging	re-
gional	variety	of	nonnative	French	that	does	not	take	the	speech	of	Paris	as	its	
primary	model.
A	 second	category	of	 exception	would	be	 research	on	Arabic	 that	begins	
with	 the	assumption	 that	 the	 language	 is	under	 siege,	whether	 the	enemy	 is	
seen	as	European	languages	or	as	the	spoken	dialects	of	Arabic	that	some	argue	
are	contaminating	the	standardized	variety,	the	fuṣħaa,	traditionally	associated	
with	 writing	 and	 formal	 contexts	 as	 described	 by	 Ferguson	 (1959).	 (See	
W	alters	[2007b]	for	a	discussion	of	the	ideologies	associated	with	these	posi-
tions.)	Obviously,	both	of	these	exceptional	bodies	of	research	are	motivated	
by	an	obsession	with	language	purism	(cf.	note	11).
3.	 How	did	French	come	to	Tunisia?
When	asked	how	French	came	to	Tunisia	or	how	it	spread,	North	Africans	and	
North	Africanists	will	 reply	quizzically	 that	 the	French	brought	 it,	 as	 if	 the	
answer	to	the	question	were	self	evident	and	perhaps	not	very	interesting.	Yet	
the	social	history	of	the	language	there	is,	in	fact,	more	complex.	Clearly	there	
were	groups	of	speakers	of	French	—	perhaps	even	communities	—	long	be-
fore	Tunisia	became	a	French	colony	in	1881.	I	contend	that	an	understanding	
of	 the	 social	history	of	 languages,	 including	French,	 in	Tunisia	 can	help	us	
understand	the	present	sociolinguistic	situation	of	the	country	and	the	region	in	
ways	that	would	otherwise	be	impossible.
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Readers	familiar	with	the	research	on	language	in	North	Africa	will	surely	
know	that	we	have	the	beginnings	of	such	discussions	about	the	social	history	
of	Arabic,	for	example,	Massignon’s	lengthy	(1924)	article,	“Éléments	arabes	
et	foyers	d’arabisation:	Leur	rôle	dans	le	monde	musulman	actuel”	and	Mar-
çais’	(1938)	“Comment	l’Afrique	du	Nord	a	été	arabisée.”	Although	each	is	
written	from	a	slightly	different	perspective	much	colored	by	the	orientalism	of	
its	time,	it	provides	us	with	insights	into	how	North	Africa	became	arabized	to	
the	extent	that	it	is,	even	today.	Further,	Massignon’s	metaphor	of	“foyer”,	lit-
erally	 ‘fireplace’	or	 ‘hearth’,	with	 its	connotations	of	physical	 location,	fire,	
heat,	light,	nativity,	and	concentrated	focus,4	is	useful	in	so	far	as	it	encourages	
us	to	think	in	terms	of	the	uses	of	Arabic,	and	in	this	case	French,	in	everyday	
life,	reminding	us	that	Arabic	did	not	spread	across	the	land	like	a	river	flood-
ing	a	plain:	 it	 spread	hearth	 to	hearth,	 school	 to	 school,	 register	 to	 register,	
speech	act	to	speech	act.	French	did	not	spread	like	a	flood	either	and	does	not	
even	now.
Let	 us	 begin	 considering	 the	 spread	 of	 French	 in	Tunisia	 by	 asking	 how	
widespread	knowledge	of	the	language	is	today.	The	most	recent	data	available	
date	 from	 1994.5	They	 present	 a	 snapshot	 of	 the	 demographics	 of	Tunisia,	
however	grainy,	at	that	time,	looking	toward	the	past	with	regard	to	the	lan-
guages	 of	 literacy	 and	 education	—	 the	 variety	 of	Arabic	 taught	 in	 school,	
French,	and	English.	They	tell	a	story	of	the	sociolinguistic	consequences	of	
colonization	and	 independence,	of	projections	of	 identity	at	 the	 level	of	 the	
ruling	power	at	the	time	(Walters	1999,	2007a,	2011).	Tunisian	girls	began	to	
get	access	to	French	—	and	Modern	Standard	Arabic	and	English	—	to	any	real	
degree	only	after	independence	in	1956,	but	by	the	mid	1990s,	Tunisian	women	
had	come	close	to	catching	up	with	men.	By	the	mid-1990s,	over	96%	of	chil-
dren	aged	6 –10	were	in	school,	including	over	90%	of	girls	in	that	age	cohort.	
Especially	when	one	recalls	that	the	mean	age	in	Tunisia	is	29,	these	data	like-
wise	demonstrate	the	extent	to	which	Tunisia	is	francisée,	an	extent	to	which	it	
never	was	during	the	colonial	period	and	was	not	intended	to	be.6
One	 should	 also	 realize	 that	 the	 status	 of	 French	 in	Tunisia	 continues	 to	
evolve.	Friends	of	mine	there	who	graduated	from	high	school	before	indepen-
dence	have	high	school	diplomas	that	were	valid	in	France	as	well	as	Tunisia	
because	 the	 exit	 exams	 they	 took	were	 the	 same	ones	 students	 their	 age	 in	
France	(as	well	as	in	a	number	of	former	French	colonies)	took.	French	was	the	
medium	of	instruction	in	these	schools,	of	course.	I	have	met	Tunisians	now	in	
their	60s	who	received	what	were	termed	bacs classiques	(i.e.,	classical	bac-
calauréats,	“baccalauréat”	being	the	French	term	for	high	school	diploma);	in	
other	words,	 they	studied	Latin	and	Greek	 in	high	school	but	precious	 little	
Arabic,	and	any	Modern	Standard	Arabic	they	might	have	studied	was	taught	
by	 a	 Frenchman	 using	 the	 grammar/translation	 method.	An	 important	 fact	
about	education	during	the	colonial	period	is	that	from	the	arrival	of	“modern	
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education”	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 there	 were	 several	 different	 kinds	 of	
schools:	colonial	schools	that	taught	European	and	Tunisian	children	in	French;	
the	elite	Collège	Sadiki in	Tunis	(Sraïb	n.d.),	which	provided	a	fully	bilingual	
education	for	young	boys	who	would	become	the	political	elite	of	independent	
Tunisia;	 les écoles franco-arabes,	 a	 system	of	 colonial	 schools	 designed	 to	
teach	Tunisians,	generally	boys,	French	and	some	Arabic;	and	schools	set	up	
by	religious	groups	or	communities,	especially	the	Catholic	Church,	the	Alli-
ance	Israélite	Universelle,	and,	during	a	certain	period,	the	London	Society	for	
Spread	of	Christianity	amongst	the	Jews	(Dornier	2000;	Perkins	2004;	Walters	
2011).	Not	surprisingly,	each	type	of	school	attracted	a	different	segment	of	the	
population.
In	 contrast,	 after	 independence,	Tunisia,	 like	many	 developing	 countries,	
made	universal	education	a	goal,	and	nearly	all	Tunisians	who	attended	school	
studied	in	institutions	controlled	by	the	Tunisian	government.	For	many	rea-
sons,	including	a	lack	of	appropriate	materials	and	trained	teachers	as	well	as	
political	will,	French	 remained	 the	primary	 language	of	 instruction	 in	 these	
schools	until	the	1980s	(cf.	Abbasi	2005;	Daoud	2001).	When	I	taught	English	
as	a	foreign	language	in	a	rural	Tunisian	school	in	the	mid-1970s,	French	was	
used	as	the	medium	of	instruction	for	all	subjects	except	religion	and	Tunisian	
history.	Thus,	success	in	science	or	math	was	predicated	on	mastery	of	French,	
and	many	of	the	teachers	with	whom	I	taught	were	French	coopérants civils or 
militaires,	roughly	contractors	working	for	the	French	government	as	part	of	
aid	to	a	former	French	colony	or	men	fulfilling	their	military	service	require-
ment	 by	 teaching	 in	 a	 former	 French	 colony.	Because	 of	 this	 situation,	 the	
first-generation	high-school	students	I	taught	interacted	almost	daily	with	na-
tive	speakers	of	French	in	and	out	of	school	even	as	they	had	the	opportunity	
to	interact	with	native	speakers	of	English.	Tunisian	education	was	completed	
Tunisified	 by	 the	 late	 70s,	 and	 the	 foreign	 teachers	 disappeared.	Also	 gone	
were	native	speaker	models	and	occasions	to	speak	with	native	speakers.	When	
a	Tunisian	student	meets	his	or	her	Tunisian	teacher	of	French	in	the	market	
today,	if	they	speak	at	all,	it	will	almost	surely	be	in	Arabic.
Today,	Arabic	is	the	language	of	instruction	in	all	pre-university	education	
in	the	country.	French	is	taught	as	a	subject	beginning	in	elementary	school;	it	
is	used	as	a	medium	of	 instruction	only	 in	certain	subjects	at	 the	university	
level	(generally	science,	technology,	engineering,	and	math).	Its	history	there	
and	the	role	it	has	traditionally	played	and	continues	to	play	as	a	marker	of	elite	
status	ensure	that	 it	will	remain	an	important	part	of	 the	symbolic	 linguistic	
economy	and	the	linguistic	ecology	of	the	country.	Yet	while	it	remains	a	sec-
ond	(rather	 than	foreign)	 language	in	 the	perceptions	of	many	Tunisians,	 its	
presence	 and	 roles	 in	 public	 life	 continue	 to	 change.	Certainly,	 it	 is	widely	
used,	especially	in	areas	that	attract	large	numbers	of	tourists.	Yet	by	the	1990s,	
government	forms	that	had	earlier	been	printed	in	Arabic	and	French	appeared	
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only	in	Arabic,	and	by	the	turn	of	the	century,	political	banners	and	other	forms	
of	public	announcements	were	often	posted	only	in	Arabic,	a	marked	shift	from	
earlier	years.
However,	as	noted,	the	continued	arabization	of	spaces	and	contexts	earlier	
reserved	 for	French	or	 for	French	and	Arabic	does	not	 signal	 an	end	 to	 the	
symbolic	value	of	French.	 Increasingly,	 the	 issue	 is	not	whether	one	knows	
French	 (after	 all,	 nearly	 everyone	 has	 studied	French	 at	 school)	 but	 having	
mastered	it	to	a	high	degree.	Obviously,	gaining	such	a	degree	of	mastery	rep-
resents	a	particular	challenge	since	French	is	no	longer	a	medium	of	instruction	
but	simply	taught	as	a	subject	in	contexts	where	there	may	be	few,	if	any,	native	
models	 of	 language	 use	 in	 daily	 interactions.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 French-	
language	media	—	television,	radio,	movies,	print,	and	electronic	media	—	are	
widely	available.	(It	is	worth	noting	that	some	of	the	French-language	media	
are	produced	by	Tunisians	in	Tunisia	as	well.)	Thus,	the	earlier	census	data	and	
these	facts	about	the	changing	role	of	French	in	education	and	society	more	
broadly	help	us	begin	 to	speculate	about	some	of	 the	 reasons	why	Tunisian	
men	and	women	of	each	generation	have	and	have	had	such	different	relation-
ships	with	each	of	their	languages.
Another	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 social	 history	 of	 French	 in	Tunisia,	 one	
necessary	for	understanding	the	place	of	French	in	the	country	today,	relates	to	
where	French	speakers	were	during	the	colonial	period.	Whereas	contempo-
rary	Tunisia	is,	as	noted,	ethnically	and	religiously	quite	homogenous,	such	has	
not	always	been	the	case,	a	fact	with	sociolinguistic	consequences.	Table	1,	for	
example,	gives	us	data	on	school	enrollment	in	1905.	(The	schools	included	
are	“modern”,	that	is	European,	schools,	where	French	was	the	medium	of	in-
struction;	Qur’anic	schools	for	Tunisian	Muslim	boys	are	not	included	nor	are	
Talmudic	schools	for	Tunisian	or	European	Jewish	boys.)	Obviously,	Muslim	
children	were	in	the	minority	in	modern	schools;	what	is	relevant	for	our	dis-
cussion	is	the	diversity	of	the	population.
Although	Europeans	made	up	a	more	or	 less	consistent	percentage	of	 the	
population	from	1921	until	1956,	7%–8%,	they	were	not	equally	spread	across	
the	protectorate.	Census	data	from	the	period	divide	the	population	into	Mus-
lims;	 local	 Jews	—	 those	who	did	 not	 have	European	 citizenship,	 however	
obtained;	and	Europeans.	(Thus,	the	category	“European”	included	European	
Christians,	 nearly	 all	 Catholics,	 as	well	 as	 Jews	 from	European	 countries.)	
Those	familiar	with	Tunisia	and	Tunisian	history	will	not	be	surprised	to	hear	
that	the	largest	percentages	of	Europeans	and	Jews	were	to	be	found	in	Tunis,	
the	capital.	Indeed,	53%	of	the	Tunis	population	was	listed	as	European	and	
9%	as	Jewish.	Thus,	some	38%	of	the	Tunis	population	was	Arab	—	or	“Mus-
lim”,	as	the	census	listed	it.	Elsewhere,	in	seventeen	of	the	conscriptions,	or	
regions,	Tunisian	Muslims	made	up	more	 than	 90%	of	 the	 population	 (and	
95%	or	more	in	twelve	of	those)	and	over	85%	in	the	two	others.
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Also	worth	noting	 is	 the	 role	played	by	naturalization	during	 this	period,	
whereby	people	who	were	not	born	French	became	French	during	their	life-
time.	(Table	17.4	in	Walters	[2011]	provides	information	from	the	1948	census	
on	naturalizations	from	1881,	the	beginning	of	French	rule,	until	the	date	of	
that	census.)	The	data	on	naturalizations	by	citizens	of	at	 least	 twenty-three	
different	countries	remind	us	that	even	among	Europeans,	many	speakers	of	
French	were	almost	assuredly	nonnative	speakers	of	 the	language,	as	would	
have	been	 the	Tunisian	 speakers	of	French.	Striking	 is	 the	 large	number	of	
naturalizations	 involving	 those	 born	 Italian	 and	 those	 born	 Tunisian	 Jews.	
Throughout	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 into	 the	 twentieth	 centuries,	 Italians	 repre-
sented	the	largest	population	of	Europeans	in	Tunisia;	the	French	became	the	
majority	 only	 in	 1920	 thanks	 to	 the	 large	 numbers	 of	 Italians	who	 became	
French	citizens.	Of	 course,	Tunisian	 Jews	 represented	a	diverse	 community	
including	 those	who	 had	 been	 there	 for	 centuries,	 arrivals	 from	Spain,	 and	
Portugal	following	the	Inquisition,	and	later	waves	of	Jewish	immigrants	from	
Italy,	 and	 they	were	 very	 differently	 positioned	 by	 the	 colonial	 power	 than	
were	Tunisian	Muslims.	The	diversity	of	 the	 Jewish	community	had	conse-
quences	for	its	dealings	first	with	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	later	with	the	colo-
nizing	power.
I	pay	special	attention	to	the	situation	of	Tunisian	Jews	here	because	despite	
their	liminal	status,	the	colonial	power	set	up	conditions	that	encouraged	as-
similation,	including	the	learning	and	use	of	French.7	As	the	data	in	Walters	
(2011)	demonstrate,	there	were	over	six	Jewish	naturalizations	for	each	Mus-
lim	naturalization	among	Tunisians.	Such	processes	of	naturalization	contin-
ued	until	the	end	of	the	colonial	period,	when	a	series	of	internal	and	external	
events	encouraged	Tunisian	Jews	and	people	who	 identified	as	European	 to	
leave	Tunisia,	helping	create	the	ethnically	and	religiously	homogeneous	coun-
try	we	find	today.
These	sources	of	information	—	the	nature	of	the	population	of	Tunis	during	
the	colonial	period,	 the	location	of	Europeans,	especially	the	French,	at	 that	
time,	and	the	questions	of	naturalization	—	give	us	some	insight	into	Tunisia’s	
linguistic	 past	 and	potentially	 its	 present.	Certainly,	 the	European	presence,	
especially	that	of	the	French,	was	significant,	not	only	because	of	the	power	it	
represented	but	also	because	of	the	numbers	of	people	involved	and	the	variety	
of	French	that	was	likely	legitimated	and	rewarded.
This	European	and	more	particularly	French	presence	in	Tunis	would	have	
assuredly	created	many	occasions	for	Europeans	speaking	French	to	one	an-
other	and	to	Tunisians,	occasions	that	had	not	existed	before	and	do	not	exist	
now.	Further,	 the	situation	created	a	context	where	speakers	from	many	lin-
guistic	backgrounds	would	have	used	French	as	their	lingua	franca.	(Likewise,	
there	are	certainly	occasions	 for	using	or	hearing	French	 today	 that	did	not	
e	xist	then:	for	example,	radio	came	to	Tunisia	in	1938).	It	is	also	worth	noting	
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that	the	colonial	census	reports	that	a	large	number	of	Europeans	spoke	Tuni-
sian	Arabic	 to	varying	degrees.	 In	 fact,	 the	French	 colonial	 government	 re-
warded	with	extra	pay	those	of	its	members	who	spoke	Arabic,	a	practice	that	
we	can	easily	associate	with	a	desire	to	understand	and	control	the	colonized.	
These	facts	remind	us	that	earlier	Tunisian	speech	communities,	and	especially	
those	 in	and	around	Tunis,	were	extremely	complex	in	 terms	of	 the	varying	
repertoires	of	their	members,	exactly	the	sorts	of	repertoires	used	in	just	the	
sorts	of	contexts	that	might	encourage	intra-	and	intersentential	codeswitching	
of	the	sort	associated	with	Tunis	today.
Indeed,	the	use	of	French	in	Tunisia	today	and	especially	the	frequent	use	of	
Arabic/ French	 codeswitching	 are	 associated	mostly	with	Tunis,	 les tunisois 
— residents	 of	Tunis,	 and	more	 particularly,	 les tunisoises	—	women	 from	
Tunis.	One	hears	both	French	and	codeswitching	far	 less	 in	other	places	—	
even	smaller	cities	—	in	Tunisia,	and	those	who	do	not	live	in	the	capital	city	
often	 comment	on	 these	practices	 in	very	negative	ways.	For	 example,	 just	
over	a	decade	ago,	a	Tunisian	friend,	a	university	professor	who	has	a	PhD	
from	a	US	university,	lived	an	hour	or	so	outside	Tunis	near	the	community	
where	he	had	grown	up	but	commuted	to	the	capital	city	every	work	day.	When	
I	asked	him	why,	he	explained	that	he	and	his	wife	lived	where	they	did	so	that	
they	could	be	near	family	—	an	important	concern	for	all	Tunisians,	but	he	also	
stated	that	he	did	not	want	his	daughters	growing	up	codeswitching	like	the	
girls	in	Tunis	do.	As	he	explained,	it	was	not	who	he	and	his	wife	were	or	who	
they	wanted	 their	daughters	 to	become.	 Importantly,	 this	man	codeswitches	
with	frequency	in	his	daily	life;	thus,	the	relevant	issue	is	one	of	degree,	some-
thing	that	is	lost	in	ideologizations	that	link	language	and	identity	categories,	
as	explained	below.	As	this	conversation	demonstrates,	one	of	the	many	things	
frequent	 use	 of	 French	 and	 codeswitching	 can	 index	 is	 an	 association	with	
u	rban	life,	urbanity,	and	whatever	else	Tunis	may	index	for	Tunisians	inside	or	
outside	the	city.
Having	offered	some	details	about	how	French	came	to	Tunisia,	details	that	
are	not	 included	in	any	of	 the	usual	discussions	of	 language	in	Tunisia,	and	
historicized	some	of	the	links	between	French	and	Tunis,	the	capital,	in	par-
ticular,	let	me	now	turn	to	the	question	of	gendering	French.
4.	 How	is	French	gendered	in	Tunisia?
Ask	any	group	of	Tunisians,	and	they’ll	tell	you	in	a	heartbeat	that	Tunisian	
women	are	better	at	French	than	Tunisian	men.	On	further	questioning,	they’ll	
explain	that,	by	this	statement,	they	are	making	any	or	all	of	several	claims:	
that	Tunisian	women	are	more	 interested	 in	mastering	French	 than	Tunisian	
men,	that	they	are	more	likely	to	use	it	and	use	it	more	often	in	codeswitching	
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involving	Arabic	than	are	Tunisian	men,	and	that	a	Tunisian	woman’s	accent	
when	speaking	French	is	more	likely	to	approximate	that	of	the	French	legiti-
mated	in	France	than	that	of	a	Tunisian	man.	Even	people	with	no	training	in	
linguistics	will	mention	or	more	likely	perform	the	use	of	the	uvular	French	/ᴚ/	
rather	than	apical	/r/	associated	with	the	French	of	Tunisian	men,	as	was	noted	
in	the	discussion	of	the	joke	that	opened	this	article.	Importantly,	people	treat	
these	claims	as	social	facts	about	Tunisian	society.	The	limited	existing	em-
pirical	 research	as	well	as	my	five	year’s	experience	 living	 in	Tunisia	since	
1975	and	dealing	with	Tunisians	there	and	in	the	United	States	convinces	me	
that	Tunisians	are	likely	correct	in	their	claims.
I	wish	to	argue	that	at	any	complete	account	of	these	social	facts	lies	in	the	
different	histories	women	and	men	in	Tunisia	have	had	with	respect	to	formal	
education	and	the	languages	in	which	that	education	would	have	been	deliv-
ered.	Prior	to	the	advent	of	modern	education	—	always	in	a	European	l	anguage	
—	 in	 the	mid-nineteenth	 century,	Tunisian	boys	who	 received	an	education	
attended	Qur’anic	or	Talmudic	schools,	depending	on	their	religion	(cf.	Per-
kins	2004).	In	contrast,	aside	from	the	case	of	elite	Tunisian	women	who	would	
have	been	tutored	by	governesses,	Tunisian	girls	and	women	first	had	access	to	
educational	opportunities	when	schools	were	created	for	the	daughters	of	the	
colonizers.	Such	opportunities	for	education	were	seized	upon	by	European,	
Tunisian	 Jewish,	 and	 Tunisian	Muslim	 families	 to	 varying	 extents	 and	 for	
varying	 reasons	 (Bakalti	 1996;	 Walters	 2007a;	 Zangar	 1997).	 Further,	 as	
Bakalti	noted,	when	education	in	Arabic	was	later	offered	to	girls,	who	were	
permitted	advanced	Qur’anic	education	only	in	1944,	it	was	limited	in	scope	
and	 content.	 By	 the	 1950s,	 for	 example,	 the	 few	 young	 women	 receiving	
higher	education	at	 the	Jaamca	El-Zitouna,	 the	Zitouna	Mosque,	a	center	of	
Islamic	learning	since	its	founding	in	698	CE,	complained	that	their	education	
included	no	French	 and	did	not	 prepare	 them	 for	 life	 in	 the	modern	world.	
Thus,	colonial	schooling	became	a	significant	foyer de francisation	for	Tuni-
sian	females	at	a	time	when	other	opportunities	were	quite	limited.	Here,	their	
status,	historically	liminal	in	some	regards,	parallels	in	some	ways	that	of	Tu-
nisian	Jews.	When	paths	to	achievement	or	advancement	open	to	majority	or	
dominant	groups	are	for	any	reason	closed	to	members	of	marginalized	groups,	
these	 latter	 often	 find	 or	 create	 alternative	 routes,	 frequently	 transgressing	
boundaries	of	one	sort	or	another	—	at	least	in	the	eyes	of	the	dominant	culture,	
and	such	transgressions	may	well	become	the	basis	for	social	change	(cf.	Wal-
ters	2011).
As	the	earlier	discussion	of	census	data	made	clear,	however,	schooling	has	
not	been	a	foyer de francisation	for	women	alone.	Today,	it	remains	the	pri-
mary	such	foyer	for	all	Tunisians,	as	noted	above.	To	the	extent	that	Western	
sociolinguistic	theorizing	is	valid,	we	might	claim	that	for	a	number	of	reasons,	
Tunisian	women	have	seized	upon	French	as	one	index	of	gender	in	the	sense	
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that	Ochs	(1992)	used	the	notion.	Clearly,	it	points	to	a	constellation	of	acts,	
activities,	and	stances	about	many	issues,	including	modern	—	in	contrast	to	
traditional	 —	 constructions	 of	 womanhood	 and	 gender	 relations	 generally	
linked	in	complex	ways	with	France	and	the	West	more	broadly.
Further,	 as	Walters	 (1996)	 explained,	mastery	 of	 a	 language	 or	 language	
variety	is	in	some	ways	essentially	different	from	many	other	sorts	of	symbolic	
capital	because	using	—	literally	embodying	—	a	language	or	language	variety	
is	a	matter	of	Bourdieu’s	habitus	—	predispositions	acquired	through	a	com-
plex	process	of	socialization.	 In	other	words,	as	a	symbolic	commodity	and	
source	of	capital,	 the	ability	 to	use	a	 language	cannot	be	directly	bought	or	
sold.	Particularly	since,	as	 Irvine	and	Gal	 (2000)	pointed	out,	 in	an	 inflated	
interactional	 economy,	 one	must	 strive	 for	 something	more	 “conspicuously	
special”,	we	might	ask	what	could	be	more	conspicuously	special	in	Tunisia	
than	French	spoken	as	in	Paris	—	or	as	not	spoken	by	many	Tunisians?	(Sig-
nificantly,	however,	 the	precise	social	meanings	of	 the	conspicuousness	and	
the	specialness	of	such	French	shifted	across	the	twentieth	century	and	con-
tinue	to	shift	in	the	twenty-first.)
As	noted,	during	the	colonial	period,	European,	Tunisian	Jewish,	and	Tuni-
sian	Muslim	families	offered	their	daughters	education	to	different	degrees	and	
for	 different	 reasons.	Among	 those	 differences	 was	 the	 nature	 of	 marriage	
within	the	culture.	Certainly	for	Tunisian	Muslims	and	Tunisian	Jews,	m	arriage	
—	especially	at	that	time	—	would	assuredly	have	been	conceived	as	a	rela-
tionship	between	families,	and	a	daughter	who	had	received	a	“European”	edu-
cation	could	compete	in	a	very	different	set	of	markets	from	one	who	had	re-
ceived	a	traditional	Qur’anic	education	or	no	education	at	all.	Even	today,	a	
Tunisian	woman	who	speaks	French	well	embodies	her	achievements,	adver-
tising	them	each	time	she	speaks.	Thus,	she	may	be	able	to	marry	up,	or	the	
young	man	marrying	her	might	be	able	to	improve	his	own	status	because	of	
his	wife’s	linguistic	abilities.	To	the	extent	she	is	successful,	she	improves	the	
symbolic	and	economic	status	of	the	family.	In	Walters	(2011),	I	detailed	as-
pects	of	how	this	process	worked	in	the	Jewish	community	of	Tunis	in	the	early	
twentieth	century,	where	language	shift	and	loss	occurred	as	the	community	
moved	 from	 speaking	 the	 Jewish	 variety	 of	 Tunisian	 Arabic	 to	 speaking	
French,	and	the	marriage	market	was	an	important	aspect	of	language	shift.
5.	 Questions	of	language	ideology
Given	this	information	about	French,	its	distribution	in	the	Tunisian	popula-
tion,	its	history	in	the	country,	and	some	of	its	social	meanings,	I	turn	to	an-
other	significant	question,	that	of	language	ideologies	about	French	and	thus	
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other	languages	in	Tunisia,	using	three	processes	that	work	together	to	create	
and	perpetuate	language	ideologies	as	discussed	by	Irvine	and	Gal	(2002).	The	
first	of	these	is	iconization,	whereby	“the	sign	relationship	between	linguistic	
features	(or	varieties)	and	the	social	images”	with	which	it	is	linked	comes	to	
function	as	an	icon.	The	relationship	may	be	“historical,	contingent,	or	conven-
tional”,	but	it	is	treated	as	essential	or	“inherent”	(Irvine	and	Gal	2002:	37).	As	
implied	above,	the	use	of	French,	the	use	of	the	uvular	/ᴚ/,	and	frequent	use	of	
intrasentential	Arabic/ French	codeswitching	have	all	come	to	have	an	iconic	
relationship	with	women,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	2.
In	 fact,	 as	Ochs	 (1992)	would	 remind	us,	 the	 steps	 involved	 in	 the	 ideo-
logical	 process	 are	 more	 complex	 than	 the	 figure	 illustrates.	 The	 practices	
noted	in	the	figure	can	be	said	more	properly	to	index	femininity	(or	minimally,	
not	masculinity),	at	least	in	certain	contexts	and	in	some	general	sense	in	Tuni-
sian	society,	which,	in	turn,	is	linked	to	the	category	“women”.	(Thus,	predict-
ably,	 the	 heterosexuality	 of	Tunisian	males	who	 speak	French	 a	 great	 deal,	
speak	 it	with	a	“French”	accent,	and/or	codeswitch	 frequently	 is	 sometimes	
called	into	question.)8
The	second	of	these	processes	is	fractal	recursivity,	whereby	“an	opposition,	
salient	at	some	level	of	relationship”	(Irvine	and	Gal	2002:	38),	is	projected	
onto	another.	Tunisians,	for	example,	in	conversation	and	in	academic	analysis	
acknowledge	that	both	men	and	women	use	French,	that	both	women	and	men	
use	the	uvular	/ᴚ/	when	speaking	the	language,	even	admitting	that	there	is	in-
traspeaker	variation	with	regard	to	this	variable	in	many	cases,	and	that	both	
men	and	women	codeswitch	using	Arabic	and	French,	as	discussed	in	the	anal-
ysis	of	the	joke	that	opened	this	article.	Yet,	the	dominant	language	ideology	
projects	 intragroup	 and	 intraspeaker	 variation	 onto	 intergroup	 categories	 of	
gender	linked	in	complex	ways	to	bodily	morphology.	Importantly,	this	gen-
dered	distinction	then	becomes	mapped	onto	dichotomies	from	other	cultural	
fields.	We	can	illustrate	these	processes	as	in	Figure	3.
The	 third	process,	erasure,	as	 its	name	 implies,	 involves	“simplifying	 the	
sociolinguistic	field,	render[ing]	some	persons	or	activities	(or	sociolinguistic	
phenomena)	invisible”	(Irvine	and	Gal	2000:	38).	In	the	Tunisian	case,	all	the	
variability	within	groups	and	speakers	gets	reduced,	coded	as	gender	differ-
ence	while	other	sorts	of	difference	—	for	example,	urbanness	versus	ruralness	
or	matters	of	social	class	—	disappear.	Likewise,	everything	that	is	not	associ-
Figure	2.	  The iconic relationships between language practices associated with French and gen-
der among Tunisians
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ated	with	maleness	and	Arabic	becomes	coded	as	female	and	French.	We	can	
illustrate	these	processes	in	Figure	4.
As	noted,	such	symbolic	work	is	decidedly	ahistorical,	and,	significantly,	it	
parallels	 a	key	component	of	 the	 creation	of	nationalism.	As	Ernest	Renan,	
philosopher	and	theorist	of	nationalism,	a	topic	to	which	we	turn	in	the	next	
section	of	 the	paper,	 famously	 remarked	 in	1882	“L’oubli,	et	 je	dirai	même	
l’erreur	historique,	sont	un	facteur	essentiel	de	la	création	d’une	nation”	[For-
getting	and	I	would	go	so	far	as	to	say	historical	error	are	an	essential	factor	in	
the	creation	of	a	nation].9
Let	us	examine	these	ideologies	at	work	by	considering	a	passage	from	the	
writings	of	Mahmoud	Dhaouadi,	a	Canadian-trained	Tunisian	who	has	written	
about	language	from	the	perspective	of	sociology	or	social	psychology.	In	sev-
eral	articles	(Dhaouadi	1984,	n.d.a,	n.d.b)	about	the	speech	of	Tunisian	women,	
Dhaouadi	has	commented	on	what	is	likely	the	greater	propensity	of	Tunisian	
women	 than	Tunisian	men	 to	 engage	 in	 codeswitching	 involving	 French.10	
Like	many	Tunisian	 academics,	 he	 refers	 to	 such	 codeswitching	 as	 franco-
arabe,	by	which	he	and	others	using	the	term	seem	to	have	in	mind	what	Myers	
Scotton	(1990,	1993)	would	term	“codeswitching	as	unmarked	choice”	of	the	
sort	found	among	the	elite	in	many	postcolonial	settings,	 i.e.,	 intrasentential	
Figure	3.	 Cases of fractal recursivity with respect to French language practices among Tunisians
Figure	4.	 The processes of erasure that gender French in Tunisia
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codeswitching	 engaged	 in	 by	 social	 peers	 (if	 only	 for	 the	 interaction);	 the	
meaning	of	the	switching	is	carried	by	the	overall	patterns	of	switches	in	con-
trast	to	the	other	categories	of	codeswitching	she	delineates.11
In	 commenting	 on	 this	 practice	 of	 codeswitching	 in	 his	 publications	 and	
manuscripts,	Dhaouadi	has	acknowledged	that	as	 individuals	and	as	groups,	
Tunisian	women	and	men	use	French,	that	their	choice	of	accent	is	gradient,	
ranging	from	very	“Arab”	or	North	African	to	very	French	or	“Parisian”,	and	
that	they	vary	in	their	choice	of	‘r’	depending	on	life	experience	and	present	
context.	Yet,	his	underlying	complaint	—	and	it	is	indeed	a	complaint	—	has	
been	 that	women	violate	 some	unspoken	norm	about	 the	appropriate	use	of	
French	or	choice	or	accent	or	‘r’	in	that	the	frequency	of	their	behavior	exceeds	
that	 of	Tunisian	men.	 Relying	 on	 early	 post-colonial	 theorists	 like	Memmi	
(1957),	a	Tunisian	Jew	who	has	 long	 lived	 in	France,	and	Trudgill’s	 (1972)	
arguments	about	gender	and	language,	Dhaouadi	argued	that	Tunisian	women	
codeswitch	and	use	the	uvular	variant	of	 /r/,	 [ᴚ],	because	they	suffer	from	a	
“double	contempt”	—	because	of	their	status	as	the	former	subjects	of	coloni-
zation,	because	of	the	continuing	conditions	for	women	in	their	own	countries,	
and	 because	 of	 the	 status	 of	 their	 unstandardized	native	 language,	Tunisian	
Arabic.	Given	the	poverty	of	their	situation,	in	a	sense,	they	blindly	imitate	the	
former	colonizer	or	do	their	best	to.	For	example,	Dhaouadi	has	commented:
Le	Maghrébin	(homme	et	femme)	est	d’abord	infériorisé	par	son	ancien	colonisateur	
(l’effet	colonial).	En	second	lieu,	la	femme	maghrébine,	surtout	éduquée,	se	sent	humil-
iée	dans	 le	contexte	moderne	par	 les	conditions	qui	prévalent	encore	dans	sa	propre	
société.	Troisièmement,	le	dialecte	arabe	que	parle	couramment	la	majorité	de	la	popu-
lation	souffre	d’un	statut	inférieur	par	rapport	au	français	et	à	l’arabe	classique!
[The	North	African,	male	and	female,	is	first	made	inferior	by	his	or	her	former	colo-
nizer	(the	colonial	effect).	In	second	place,	the	North	African	woman,	especially	if	edu-
cated,	feels	humiliated	in	modern	contexts	by	the	conditions	that	continue	to	prevail	in	
her	own	society.	Third,	dialectal	Arabic,	which	is	spoken	by	the	majority	of	the	popula-
tion,	suffers	from	an	inferior	status	by	comparison	with	French	or	Classical	Arabic.]
(Dhaouadi	1984:	94;	cited	by	Trabelsi	1991:	94)
This	specific	passage	is	of	interest	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	as	is	evident	
from	the	citation	of	the	French	original,	Dhaouadi’s	analysis	has,	in	fact,	been	
quoted	by	other	Tunisian	academics,	in	this	case,	by	Chedia	Trabelsi,	a	Tuni-
sian	woman.	Following	up	on	his	comments,	Trabelsi	noted:
Cette	déclaration	est	certes	exagérée	si	on	pense	à	tous	les	Maghrébins,	mais	elle	est	
assez	fidèle	en	ce	qui	concerne	la	tunisoise	éduquée	et	jeune.
[This	claim	is	certainly	exaggerated	if	one	considers	all	North	Africans	but	it	 is	 true	
enough	with	respect	to	young,	educated	women	from	Tunis.]
(Trabelsi	1991:	94)
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In	other	words,	Dhaouadi’s	comments	cannot	be	said	to	be	extraordinary	in	
any	sense,	nor	can	they	simply	be	attributed	to	his	being	male.	We	might	note	
that	Trabelsi	did	acknowledge	 the	complicating	 factor	of	urban	versus	 rural	
status,	but	she	did	not	question	his	basic	claims	that	gender	French	in	complex	
ways.
A	second	reason	I	find	this	passage	especially	interesting	is	that	it	sets	up	a	
series	 of	 explicit	 comparisons	 that	 become	 analogies,	 a	 common	 analytical	
move	in	the	creation	or	analysis	of	ideologies	of	any	kind.	In	Figure	5,	I	present	
these	comparisons	and	link	them	as	Dhaouadi	indirectly	did.
Such	 dichotomous	 analogical	 chains	 are	 a	 key	 component	 of	 ideological	
thinking	generally	and	can	frequently	be	found	in	discussions	where	language	
ideologies	are	at	play.12	In	this	set	of	analogies,	we	see	examples	of	all	three	of	
the	processes	discussed	by	 Irvine	and	Gal	 (2000).	First,	we	see	 iconization,	
where	a	language	—	French,	aspects	of	French	such	as	accent	or	even	the	use	
of	the	/ᴚ/,	or,	I	might	add,	a	linguistic	practice,	codeswitching	—	is	taken,	to	
use	Irvine	and	Gal’s	words,	to	“depict	or	display	a	social	group’s	inherent	na-
ture	or	essence”	(Irvine	and	Gal	2000:	37),	in	this	case,	that	of	Tunisian	women,	
the	behavior	of	men	needing	no	explanation.	Second,	we	find	fractal	recursiv-
ity	because	a	salient	opposition	at	the	one	level	—	variable	linguistic	behavior	
within	the	individual	or	the	group	—	is	projected	onto	intergroup	difference,	
the	behavior	of	males	and	females.	The	opposition	is	further	mapped	on	the	
distinction	 between	 standard	 and	 dialect,	 that	 between	 the	 former	 colonial	
power	and	the	colony,	and	an	assessment	of	moral	value	—	superior	versus	
inferior.	Such	multiple	mappings	of	phenomena	that	are	otherwise	unrelated,	
including	assessments	of	moral	value,	again	characterize	ideological	thinking	
generally.	Finally,	as	implied,	there	is	strong	evidence	of	erasure	because	vari-
ability	is	erased	and	difference	essentialized.	Thus,	from	Irvine	and	Gal’s	per-
spective,	Dhaouadi	has	had	to	“ignore	or	minimize”	the	reality	of	his	own	ob-
servations	to	make	such	metonymous	distinctions.
Such	ideologies	never	emerge	from	nowhere.	They,	too,	have	histories,	and	
to	recall	Renan’s	observation	about	nationalism,	these	histories	are	generally	
forgotten,	recalled	in	error,	or,	in	many	cases,	unknown.	There	is,	of	course,	the	
history	of	women’s	access	to	education	in	Tunisia,	an	issue	Dhaouadi	mentions	
in	passing	but	does	not	 investigate	 to	any	degree.	There	 is	also	 the	 issue	of	
Figure	5.	 Dichotomies that gender French in Tunisia (Cf. Dhaouadi 1984)
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complex	link	of	French	with	urbanity,	something	noticed	by	Trabelsi	but	not	
Dhaouadi.	Likewise,	there	is	the	settlement	history	—	to	use	an	apt	construct	
from	traditional	dialectology	—	of	Tunis,	the	changing	demographics	of	the	
city	and	the	surrounding	suburban	areas,	and	the	changing	nature	of	face-to-
face	interactions,	things	reminiscent	of	Massignon’s	notion	of	foyer.
Further,	as	noted,	Dhaouadi	himself	seems	much	influenced	by	the	work	of	
Memmi	—	and	we	can	certainly	assume	he	is	familiar	with	the	work	of	writers	
like	Fanon	and	other	who	theorized	about	the	North	African	situation	—	and	
by	the	early	work	of	Trudgill.	(Apparently,	he	was	unaware	of	the	responses	or	
research	Trudgill’s	initial	discussion	of	gender	and	prestige	gave	rise	to.)
Yet,	 fully	 appreciating	 the	 local	meanings	 of	Dhaouadi’s	 claims	 requires	
knowledge	of	 the	 local	context,	specifically,	knowledge	of	 the	nature	of	na-
tional	identity	as	understood	by	Tunisians.	In	the	next	section	of	this	paper,	I	
seek	 to	 link	 the	 ideologies	 that	gender	French	and	hence	Arabic	with	other,	
larger	dichotomies	of	Tunisian	daily	life.
The	particulars	in	Tunisia,	represented	schematically,	are	given	in	Table	2.	
The	poles	of	debates	related	in	any	way	to	questions	of	national	 identity	—	
Table	2.	 Discursive dichotomies constitutive of Tunisian national identity
Arabic	term aṣaala tafattuħ
Meaning firmness,	steadfastness,	strength	of	
character;	nobility	of	descent,	
purity	of	origin.
openness,	receptivity	(spiritual,	
mental).
Derivation Verbal	noun	derived	from	the	verb	
aṣula:	to	be	or	become	firmly	
rooted;	to	be	firmly	established;	to	
be	of	noble	origin.
Verbal	noun	derived	from	the	verb	
tafattaħa:	to	open,	open	up,	
unfold	(intr.);	to	be	opened	.	.	.	;	
to	be	open,	responsive	(heart).	
(Wehr	1974:	f-t-ħ)
Lexical	items	
derived	from	
the	same	root
Lexical	items	derived	from	a-ṣ-l:	
root,	trunk	(of	a	tree);	origin,	
source;	inception;	cause,	reason;	
descent,	lineage,	stock	(esp.	one	
of	noble	character);	foundation,	
fundament;	basis;	the	original	
.	.	.	;	original	work;	aṣlii:	original,	
primary,	primal,	initial;	genuine,	
authentic,	pure;	basic,	
fundamental,	principal,	chief,	
main;	regular;	real,	actual	.	.	.	luɣa	
aṣliyya	mother	tongue.	(Wehr	
1974:	a-ṣ-l ).
French	translation	
equivalent
authenticité ouverture
English	gloss ‘authenticity’ ‘openness’
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whether	the	proper	role	of	Arabic	or	French	in	education,	the	proper	nature	of	
Islam,	or	proposed	changes	to	laws	about	women	and	families	in	society	—	are	
often	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 dichotomy	 contrasting	aṣaala,	 an	Arabic	 term	
rendered	 into	French	as	authenticité,	with	 tafattuħ,	an	Arabic	 term	rendered	
into	French	as	ouverture.13	For	simplicity,	I’ll	 refer	 to	 the	dichotomy	as	au-
thenticity and	openness.	Table	2	gives	 information	about	 the	semantic	fields	
associated	with	the	Arabic	terms.
As	linguists	would	expect,	the	mapping	from	Arabic	to	French,	t	ypologically	
distinct	languages,	is	by	no	means	perfect,	an	observation	made	and	exploited	
in	an	important	essay	by	one	of	Tunisia’s	finest	thinkers,	Abdelwaheb	Bouh-
diba	(1995),	“Des	difficulties	d’être	soi-meme:	Açala-authenticité”	[The	diffi-
culties	of	being	oneself:	.	.	.	],	which	examines	the	slippage	between	the	Arabic	
term	 and	 its	 French	 “equivalent”,	 exploiting	 it	masterfully.	 (Such	 bilingual	
slippage	is	a	reality	Tunisians	live	with	daily.)	Significant	here,	however,	are	
the	 facts	 that,	 first,	Tunisians	 generally	 value	 both	 of	 these	 qualities	 highly	
while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 fully	 acknowledging	 the	 tension	between	 them	and,	
second,	each	of	these	poles	is	further	linked	to	a	series	of	other	values,	setting	
up	more	of	the	analogies	of	the	sort	Dhaouadi	assumed.
We	can	analyze	these	dichotomies,	which	become	parts	of	analogical	chains	
of	identity,	in	terms	of	iconization	of	some	social	phenomenon,	fractal	recur-
sivity,	and	erasure.	Figure	6	lists	some	common	contrasts	one	finds	evidence	of	
in	Tunisians	daily	discourse,	whether	casual	conversation	or	academic	debate.	
Large	sections	of	Abbasi	(2005)	are	devoted	to	commenting	on	the	first	four	of	
these	although,	as	explained	in	note	12,	he	framed	the	first	pair	as	“authentic-
ity”	and	“modernity”.	The	 lexicon	of	Tunisian	Arabic	can	be	 said	 to	 reflect	
aspects	of	 these	dichotomies	as	well.	For	example,	 speakers	distinguish	be-
tween	an	Arab	houses	built	around	a	courtyard,	dar ʕarabi ‘Arab	house’, and	
a	 “villa”,	 a	 European	 (=	French)-style	 house	 that	 is	 not;	 between	 “Arabic”	
c	arrots	 fed	 to	animals	and	“French”14	carrots	eaten	by	people,	 and	between	
Figure	6.	  Linking the dichotomies in Table 1 to other dichotomous pairs of values that constitute 
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“Arabic”	toilets	(called	“Turkish”	or	“squat	toilets”	in	the	US),	and	“French”	
toilets.	 In	a	profound	sense,	 these	dichotomies	and	their	reflexes	encode	the	
consequences	of	the	colonial	experience.
From	 such	 a	 perspective,	 in	 contrast	 to	 French,	Arabic	 is	 authentic.	We	
should	not	be	surprised	to	find	authenticity	and	Arabic	linked	to	Islam	and	the	
Muslim	world	or	to	tradition,	especially	as	they	contrast	with	openness,	which	
is	linked	to	French,	the	West	more	broadly,	progress,	and	modernity.	Yet,	as	
might	be	expected,	such	dichotomies	contain	the	seeds	of	contradiction.	Thus,	
while	Arabic	is	authentic	in	contrast	to	French,	in	a	different	situation,	Tuni-
sians	will	quickly	admit	that	Tunisian	Arabic,	the	national	dialect	and	every-
one’s	native	language,	is	in	some	sense	more	“authentic”	than	Modern	Stan-
dard	Arabic,	which	is	 learned	at	school	—	just	 the	sort	of	 ideological	move	
Ferguson	(1959)	taught	us	to	predict	about	diglossia.	This	slippage	is	signifi-
cant.	It	helps	us	understand	how	and	why	Tunisians	come	to	see	authenticity	as	
self	and	openness	as	other	in	some	contexts,	though	both	qualities	are	valued.	
It	also	enables	us	to	see	why	Dhaouadi	in	particular	and	Tunisians	more	gener-
ally,	even	educated	Tunisian	women	like	Trabelsi,	sometimes	end	up	identify-
ing	the	constellation	of	things	often	associated	with	authenticity	as	male	and	
those	often	associated	with	openness	as	female.
Such	an	ideologization	takes	place	even	though	in	Tunisia,	as	elsewhere,	one	
can	point	to	many	ways	in	which	just	the	opposite	seems	to	be	the	case.	For	
example,	Tunisian	men	certainly	took	up	Western	dress	long	before	Tunisian	
women	did.	Women	there	continue	to	be	more	likely	to	wear	traditional	cloth-
ing,	and	when	 they	do,	 its	meanings	are	often	different	 than	when	Tunisian	
men	wear	 it.	Although	Tunisian	 law	 states	 that	men	 and	woman	 can	marry	
whom	they	please,	custom	dictates	that	Muslim	Tunisian	men	may	marry	out-
side	 their	faith	while	Muslim	Tunisian	women	cannot.	And	finally,	Tunisian	
females	were	and	in	some	ways	continue	to	be	protected	—	if	not	sequestered	
—	from	participation	in	the	world	outside	the	home,	the	community,	or	the	na-
tion.	(In	these	cases,	Tunisian	women,	like	women	in	many	cultures,	are	or	are	
seen	as	bearers	of	traditional	or	authentic	culture.)
As	I	have	noted,	 the	dichotomies	I	have	presented	are	 the	dominant	ones	
seen	from	and	through	the	dominant	ideology,	one	that	is	—	and	continues	to	
be	—	overwhelmingly	male	as	is	likely	the	case	worldwide.	It	is	important	to	
note	that	Tunisian	women	enjoy	legal	rights	of	many	sorts	not	enjoyed	by	their	
Muslim	sisters	across	the	Arab	world	because	issues	related	to	personal	status	
—	and	therefore	marriage	and	the	family	—	are	issues	decided	in	civil	rather	
than	religious	courts.	Yet	even	historians	of	the	women’s	situation	in	Tunisia	
explicitly	state	or	imply	that	they	have	those	rights	largely	because	of	the	deci-
sions	and	actions	of	men,	especially	Habib	Bourguiba,	Tunisia’s	first	president,	
and	more	 recently,	 President	 Zine	El	Abidine	Ben	Ali	 (e.g.,	 Charrad	 2001;	
Marzuki	1993).
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Such	a	situation	might	lead	some	to	claim	that	in	contrast	to	women,	or	at	
least	educated	women,	who	construct	their	nation-state	as	modern,	men	(and	
by	default,	uneducated	women)	construct	it	as	authentic.	Yet,	such	an	analysis	
is	too	simple.	A	more	nuanced	reading	of	these	dichotomies	might	argue	that	
many	educated	women	and	male	political	“liberals”,	and	I	use	the	term	advis-
edly,	assume	both	poles	of	the	dichotomy	are	important	and	that	they	can	co-
exist	in	tension	productively.15	Indeed,	it	is	the	tension	that	produces	much	that	
is	uniquely	Tunisian	in	the	eyes	of	this	group	of	Tunisians.
Such	a	view	was	surely	that	of	the	early	leaders	of	the	Tunisian	state,	men	
who	had	generally	 received	 bilingual	 educations,	most	 often	 at	 the	Collège	
Sadiki,	 as	noted.	These	men	were	 fully	 comfortable	 speaking	French,	often	
having	received	their	higher	education	in	France.	In	using	French	well	—	and	
often	by	adhering	to	prescriptive	norms	no	longer	in	common	use	among	na-
tive	speakers	in	the	metropole	with	regard	to	syntax	or	morphology	(e.g.,	the	
use	of	the	imparfait du subjonctif   ),	these	leaders	demonstrated	their	mastery	
of	the	French	language	and	the	culture	associated	with	it.	Yet	when	they	spoke	
French,	they	generally	did	so	with	an	accent	that	was	unmistakably	North	Af-
rican,	however	heavy	or	light.	Their	phonology	enabled	them	to	convey	a	dif-
ferent	message,	a	 loyalty	 to	 their	North	Africanness	 that	exclaimed:	“I	may	
have	become	a	master	of	your	language,	but	you	have	not	become	the	master	
of	 my	 soul.”	 Thus	 their	 use	 of	 French	 represented	 an	 interesting	 case	 of	
Bakhtinian	double-voicing,	one	that	assuredly	occurs	with	great	frequency	in	
many	bilingual	speech	communities.
To	the	extent	that	I	am	correct	in	my	analysis	of	this	often	strongly	accented	
French,	we	might	ask	whether,	instead	of	imitating	the	native	speakers	of	stan-
dard	French	with	respect	to	accent,	as	Dhaouadi	contended	Tunisian	women	
do,	Tunisian	women	are	not	merely	(or	at	least	also)	distinguishing	themselves	
from	Tunisian	men,	who	have	defined	themselves	symbolically	in	contrast	to	
the	now-former	colonizer.	Further,	they	are	doing	so	in	a	culture	where	there	is	
near	universal	acceptance	of	the	ideology	of	gender	complementarity.	Given	the	
nature	and	power	of	gender	complementarity	and	Tunisia’s	history,	we	might	
wish	to	argue	that	the	ideologies	discussed	in	this	article	are	overdetermined.
What	should	be	clear	is	that	Tunisian	women	and	men	are	positioned	differ-
ently	in	and	by	these	ideologies.	Thus,	the	same	behavior	when	performed	by	
a	female	or	male	is	valued	and	evaluated	differently.	In	an	important	way,	then,	
Tunisian	women,	through	their	knowledge	and	use	of	French,	are	left	dépay-
sées	 in	their	own	country.	In	other	words,	 the	ideologies	and	chains	of	met-
onymic	reasoning	sketched	here	symbolically	locate	them	outside	the	nation-
state.	Specific	instances	of	the	use	of	French	and	particularly	the	evaluations	
and	social	meanings	of	these	uses	of	French	are	further	complicated	by	vari-
ables	like	amount	and	kind	of	education,	class	and	region	of	origin	and	resi-
dence,	and	even	political	orientation	of	the	listener	even	more	so	than	that	of	
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the	speaker.	The	situation	becomes	yet	more	complex	when	we	acknowledge	
the	variable	nature	of	many	such	behaviors	and	evaluations	of	them.
As	Irvine	and	Gal	noted,	“when	such	oppositions”,	by	which	they	mean	the	
sorts	of	dichotomies	analyzed	 in	 this	paper,	“are	reproduced	within	a	single	
person,	they	do	not	concern	contrasting	identities	so	much	as	oppositions	be-
tween	activities	or	roles	associated	with	prototypical	social	persons”	(Irvine	
and	Gal	2000:	38).	Ochs	(1992),	of	course,	argued	that	indirect	indexicality,	
perhaps	the	most	powerful	symbolic	and	ideological	work	done	by	and	through	
language,	is	most	often	associated	with	acts,	activities	and	stances.	All	three	
scholars	 pointed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 ideologies	 are	 created	 and	 reproduced	 not	
through	broad	categories	like	gender	but	through	specific	repeated	activities,	
roles,	acts,	and	stances	that	come	to	be	gendered	across	time	in	particular	his-
torical	contexts.	Scholars	like	Bourdieu	(1990)	or	Butler	(1993)	who	focus	on	
the	habitus	and	performativity,	respectively,	might	make	similar	observations	
from	a	slightly	different	perspective.	Thus,	 it	 is	here	 that	we	should	seek	 to	
understand	the	origins	of	ideologies,	whether	they	concern	language	or	some	
other	social	phenomenon.
6.	 Conclusion
I	began	this	paper	hoping	to	shed	light	on	three	sets	of	related	issues,	the	pres-
ence	of	French	in	Tunisia,	its	gendered	social	meanings,	and	ideologies	associ-
ated	with	those	meanings.	Along	the	way,	I	have	discussed	a	range	of	topics	
that	bear	on	these	issues:	the	demographics	of	languages	in	Tunisia;	the	nature	
of	the	Tunisian	population,	especially	the	“European”	population	and	its	loca-
tion	during	the	colonial	period;	and	the	implicit	logic	as	well	as	the	internal	
contradictions	of	Tunisian	ideologies	of	language	and	gender	as	they	relate	to	
and	construct	French	and	Arabic.	Importantly,	I	would	contend,	I	have	sought	
to	begin	historicizing	these	phenomena	so	that	we	might	have	a	better	under-
standing	of	how	they	came	to	be.
While	my	 focus	 has	 been	 the	 construction	 and	 linking	 of	 femininity	 and	
French	by	Tunisians,	I	have	indirectly	been	constructing	the	links	found	there	
between	masculinity	and	Arabic,	even	as	I	raised	questions	about	the	nature	of	
nationalism	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 for	 Tunisians.	 Though	 Tunisians	 often	 contrast	
A	rabic	and	French,	my	observations	near	the	end	of	my	analysis	make	clear	
that	a	more	accurate	formulation	of	the	contrast	might	be	a	more	profoundly	
structuralist	 one:	 monolingual	Arabic	 or	 not	 monolingual	Arabic,	 which	 in	
T	unisia	often	becomes	Arabic/ French	bilingualism,	 including	Arabic/ French	
codeswitching.	Although	 such	 an	 account	 favors	 social	 structures	 over	 the	
agency	of	individuals,	I	have	also	sought	to	demonstrate	ways	in	which	Tuni-
sian	women,	in	particular,	positioned	by	these	ideologies,	find	room	for	agency	
Gendering French in Tunisia	 105
even	when	doing	so	results	 in	 their	being	criticized	for	being	 inauthentic	 in	
some	way	—	not	being	Tunisian	enough	or	being	too	French	or	European.	At	
some	level,	such	charges	are	predicated	on	a	nineteenth-century	view	of	lan-
guage	and	nationalism	that	Westerners,	at	least,	see	as	unproblematically	link-
ing	a	language,	a	people,	and	a	nation	(or	nation-state)	in	ways	that	rarely,	if	
ever,	correspond	with	what	we	might	term	the	reality	on	the	ground	(cf.	note	
11).
Over	 the	years,	 in	discussing	 the	 relationships	 that	 I	 understand	Tunisian	
men	and	women	to	have	with	French	and	Arabic	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	
these	relationships	are	ideologized,	I	have	sometimes	found	that	my	interlocu-
tors	find	the	situation	I	describe	most	unusual,	if	not	bizarre.	From	my	perspec-
tive,	nothing	could	be	further	from	the	truth.	In	surveying	Anglophone	univer-
sity	students	in	Lebanon,	Diab	(2000)	found	that	both	female	and	male	students	
expected	females	to	be	speak	English	and/or	French	better	than	males	and	to	
have	a	more	native-like	accent	when	 they	doing	so.	During	 the	years	 that	 I	
taught	doctoral	students	at	the	University	of	Texas	(1991–2006),	I	often	found	
that	females	from	a	range	of	countries,	more	than	males	from	the	same	coun-
tries,	were	 likely	 interested	 in	 speaking	 their	primary	 foreign	 language,	En-
glish,	with	accents	that	marked	them	less	obviously	as	to	place	of	origin.	In	a	
goodly	number	of	cases,	as	with	South	Korean	men	speaking	English,	the	lack	
of	interest	in	“having	a	good	accent”	seems	to	be	related	to	overlapping	con-
structions	of	masculinity	and	nationalism:	a	Korean	man	who	speaks	English	
without	a	marked	Korean	accent	 is	perceived	by	other	Koreans,	 female	and	
male,	as	being	not	quite	manly	and	not	quite	Korean.	Closer	to	home,	the	way	
that	Western	sociolinguists	have	sometimes	been	quick	to	label	women’s	use	
of	standard	forms	or	engaging	in	Labovian	hypercorrection	as	evidence	of	lin-
guistically	insecure	while	the	behavior	of	men	who	use	nonstandard	forms	or	
stigmatized	variants	is	analyzed	in	terms	of	covert	prestige	shows	interesting	
parallels	with	the	Tunisian	situation:	women’s	behavior	is	framed	as	somehow	
deviant	without	acknowledgment	of	the	ways	in	which	such	labeling	simulta-
neously	positions	men’s	behavior	as	the	norm.
In	such	cases,	men’s	use	and	understanding	of	the	use	of	 languages	other	
than	the	native	one	might	be	seen	as	utilitarian.	Symbolically,	it	can	be	linked	
to	an	 imagined	status	quo	 that	 is,	 in	fact,	a	nostalgic	 longing	for	a	past	 less	
characterized	by	heterogeneity	than	the	present	moment.	In	contrast,	women’s	
use	and	understanding	of	the	use	of	languages	other	than	the	native	one	can	be	
seen	as	an	effort	to	shift	the	currency	of	the	society’s	symbolic	economy.	(In	
these	cases,	 linguistic	skill	comes	 to	 represent	a	 resource	 for	a	woman	who	
possesses	 it	as	well	as	 those	with	whom	she	is	associated.)	Such	tendencies	
with	regard	to	the	nature	of	the	past	and	the	future	and	such	competing	visions	
of	authenticity	can	be	found	in	all	societies.	Interestingly,	in	the	situations	de-
scribed	here,	each	position	comes	to	be	gendered	through	language.
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From	a	different	perspective,	I	would	note	that	during	the	early	1990s,	when	
I	regularly	taught	courses	on	African	American	English,	again	at	the	University	
of	Texas	at	Austin,	I	repeatedly	found	that	the	African	American	women	in	my	
course	defined	Standard	English	as	“talking	proper”	while	the	African	Amer-
ican	males	defined	it	as	“talking	white”.	Here,	yet	again,	we	see	a	gendering	of	
a	language	variety	by	members	of	a	speech	community,	one	that	assuredly	has	
consequences	for	the	speech	community	and	American	society	at	large.	In	such	
a	sociohistorical	context,	what	self-respecting	African	American	male	would	
wish	to	be	seen	as	a	user	of	Standard	English?
Whatever	the	consequences	of	such	gendered	language	ideologies	and	what-
ever	historical	circumstances	might	have	given	rise	to	them,	I	trust	these	anec-
dotes	demonstrate	that	we,	as	analysts,	are	safe	in	assuming	that	gendered	lan-
guage	ideologies	are	widespread	and	in	no	sense	limited	to	Tunisia,	the	Arab	
world,	 or	 the	 developing	world	more	 broadly.	Understanding	 them	 in	 their	
complexity	will	require	that	we	pay	attention	to	the	social	history	of	languages	
and	language	varieties	in	the	speech	communities	we	study,	drawing	on	many	
sorts	of	 sources,	 ranging	 from	ethnographic	fieldwork	 to	 census	data	 to	 the	
joke	with	which	I	began	this	paper.
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Notes
	 *		 This	paper	grows	out	of	talks	I	have	given	over	the	past	decade	in	a	range	of	settings	includ-
ing	conferences	 in	Tangier,	Morocco	 (2001),	Lancaster,	UK	(2002),	Berkeley	 (2003)	and	
UT-Austin	(2003)	as	well	as	lectures	at	Rice	University	(2004)	and	Portland	State	University	
(2006).	I	am	deeply	grateful	for	the	comments	from	audience	members	in	all	these	settings	
that	have	led	me	to	 think	about	 the	complex	issues	discussed	in	 this	article	 in	new	ways.	
Thanks	also	to	Jonathan	Tamez	for	his	insights	into	the	situation	described	here.
	 1.	 While	studying	with	Joel	Sherzer	 in	 the	early	1980s,	 I	heard	him	remark	 that	 if	he	had	a	
single	afternoon	in	which	to	collect	data	in	order	to	understand	a	culture,	he	would	ask	its	
members	to	tell	him	jokes,	which,	upon	analysis,	would	reveal	much	of	importance	about	the	
culture’s	social	organization	and	values.	They	would	do	so	precisely	by	revealing	the	fault	
lines	within	the	society	as	well	as	the	ideologies	that	have	been	created	to	naturalize	catego-
ries	of	social	difference.
	 2.	 Within	the	framework	of	Myers	Scotton	(1993),	one	could	analyze	both	of	these	switches	as	
marked.	“Local	anesthetic”	could	be	seen	as	a	cultural	borrowing	although	it	has	an	equiva-
lent	in	Modern	Standard	Arabic	(MSA).	We	can	safely	predict	that	younger	Tunisians,	hav-
ing	received	far	more	of	their	education	in	Arabic	than	the	woman	in	the	joke	or	those	retell-
ing	the	joke	in	the	1980s,	would	be	more	likely	to	use	an	Arabic	expression	here	were	they	
telling	this	joke	today.	(Of	course,	using	an	expression	originating	in	MSA	here	would	mean	
the	loss	of	any	implicatures	associated	with	use	of	a	French	term	for	something	associated	
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with	modern	medicine.)	I	can	attest	 that	many	lexical	 items	and	expressions	of	French	or	
Italian	origin	that	I	learned	in	the	1970s	as	a	student	of	Tunisian	Arabic	have	been	replaced	
by	 their	MSA	 equivalents	 at	 least	 among	 younger	 speakers.	 “Imported”	 is	 not	merely	 a	
marked	switch;	it	is	iconic	in	some	crucial	sense,	laminating	language	choice	and	the	ideol-
ogy	being	held	up	to	ridicule:	anything	imported	is	better	than	anything	local.
	 3.	 With	respect	 to	the	phonology	used	for	renditions	of	“La	Marsa”	in	contrast	 to	its	Arabic	
equivalent,	it	is	important	to	note	that,	as	in	codeswitching	generally,	the	choice	of	a	lexical	
item	—	including	the	rendering	of	a	geographic	place	name	—	may	serve	one	or	more	inter-
actional,	 rhetorical,	 or	 social	 functions	while	 the	 phonology	 used	 to	 pronounce	 it	 serves	
others.	 Further,	when	 retelling	 this	 joke,	men	who	 generally	 spoke	 French	with	 a	North	
A	frican	accent	sometimes	used	an	accent	much	closer	to	the	one	associated	with	Standard	
French.	In	so	doing,	they	were	heard	as	mocking	those	whose	French	was	closer	to	the	pre-
scriptive	standard	—	imported	—	rather	than	the	local	variety	(cf.	Chun	2004).
	 4.	 This	 term	 also	 shows	 up	 in	 French	 expressions	 as	 diverse	 as	 “source	 of	 heat”,	 “seismic	
f ocus”,	“center	of	an	 infection”,	“hotbed	of	corruption”,	“broken	home”,	“return	 to	one’s	
native	land ”,	“student	center”	and	“focus	of	a	lens”	(Mansion	et	al.	1980:	q.v.).
	 5.	 See	Walters	(2007a)	for	additional	detail	on	these	data	and	for	charts	illustrating	the	demo-
graphics	of	the	languages	of	literacy	in	Tunisia	for	females	and	males	in	1984.	As	best	I	can	
determine	based	on	the	available	electronic	information,	questions	about	languages	read	and	
written	were	not	asked	in	the	more	recent	2004	census.	An	obvious	truth	should	be	restated	
here:	census	data	are	inherently	problematic,	but	they	are	often	the	best	data	available	for	
discussions	of	language	at	the	national	level.
	 	 	 Worth	noting	in	this	context	is	the	fact	that	whereas	the	results	of	the	1994	census	were	
published	in	French,	the	results	of	the	2004	census	were	published	in	Arabic	(though	some	
information	about	the	results	is	published	online	in	French	—	these	data	are	available	under	
“Publications	en	ligne”	at	http://www.ins.nat.tn/indexen.php).
	 6.	 A	similar	situation	holds	in	many	countries	colonized	by	the	European	powers.	During	the	
colonial	period,	access	to	the	colonial	language	was	limited	to	an	elite	among	the	colonized;	
stated	differently,	by	learning	the	colonial	language,	those	who	were	colonized	could	aspire	
to	elite	status	in	new	ways.	Following	the	colonial	period,	policies	that	envisioned	universal	
education	mandated	education	in	the	language	of	the	colonizer	generally	because	there	was	
a	lack	of	teachers	ready	to	teach	in	the	local	language(s)	as	well	as	a	lack	of	materials	for	
them	to	use	in	teaching.	(In	many	multilingual	countries,	the	language	of	the	former	colo-
nizer	was	chosen	as	 a	 “neutral”	national	 language,	whether	or	not	 it	was	granted	official	
status,	 in	an	effort	 to	mitigate	pre-existing	 interethnic	 tension.)	Thus	access	 to	schooling,	
coupled	with	population	growth	(even	in	countries	like	Tunisia,	where	family	planning	has	
been	strong	since	the	1960s),	ensured	the	growth	in	the	number	and	percentage	of	the	popu-
lation	that	spoke	the	language	of	the	former	colonizer.
	 7.	 In	contrast	to	Algeria,	officially	part	of	France	from	1848–1962,	where	Sephardic	Jews	(“les	
israélites	 indigènes	de	 l’Algérie”)	were	granted	French	citizenship	 in	1870	by	 the	Décret	
Crémieux,	local	Jews	in	Tunisia,	a	French	colony	from	1881–1956,	and	Morocco,	a	French	
protectorate	from	1912–1956,	were	never	as	groups	offered	French	citizenship.	The	decree	
also	offered	Algerian	Muslims	French	citizenship;	however,	they	had	to	request	it	and	agree	
to	live	by	French	laws,	thus	giving	up	any	rights	to	be	subject	to	the	Islamic	legal	system.	In	
contrast	to	Algerian	Jews,	Algerian	Muslims	had	no	interest	in	forsaking	the	Islamic	legal	
system.
	 8.	 Obviously,	 categories	 related	 to	 sexuality	 and	 sexual	 behavior	 are	 culturally	 constructed.	
Traditionally	and	perhaps	predictably	in	a	culture	that	has	practiced	sex	segregation	to	a	de-
gree	unknown	in	the	West	and	that	has	fetishized	female	virginity	at	marriage,	merely	par-
ticipating	in	sexual	intercourse	involving	two	males	has	been	far	less	stigmatized	than	taking	
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the	role	of	the	so-called	passive	partner,	a	situation	that	in	many	ways	parallels	attitudes	to-
ward	male	same-sex	intercourse	and	homosexual	behavior	more	broadly	in	the	cultures	of	
Latin	America.
	 9.	 It	is	also	worth	noting	that	in	gendering	the	pronunciation	of	/r/	when	speaking	French	as	
Tunisians	and	North	Africans	generally	do,	people	in	these	countries	are	assigning	new	sym-
bolic	meanings	to	a	practice	that	was	and	remains	ideologically	laden	among	native	speakers	
of	French	in	France.	There,	the	use	of	the	apical	variant	represents	a	categorical	regional	dia-
lect	feature,	a	quantitative	class-based	distinction,	and	a	quantitative	gender-based	distinc-
tion.	Thus,	regional	dialects	where	[ʁ]	is	the	variant	used	are	generally	the	overtly	prestigious	
ones.	Within	social	classes	in	a	given	geographic	area,	those	of	the	educated	classes	are	more	
likely	to	use	[ʁ]	than	[r],	and	within	a	social	class,	women	are	more	likely	to	use	[ʁ]	than	[r].	
Such	facts	remind	us	of	 the	contingent	nature	of	 language	ideologies	and	the	need	for	an	
understanding	of	 the	 social	history	of	 languages	and	 language	varieties.	 In	 fact,	many	of	
these	observations,	along	with	other	relevant	ones,	can	be	found	in	the	discussion	included	
as	part	of	Riahi	(1968).
	10.	 I	 found	 the	 two	 unpublished	manuscripts	 in	 the	 library	 of	CEMAT,	 the	Centre	 d’Etudes	
Maghrébines	à	Tunis.	My	comments	should	not	be	taken	as	an	ad hominem;	rather,	as	the	
citation	of	Dhaouadi’s	1984	article	by	Trabelsi	(1991)	demonstrated,	his	comments	represent	
perspectives	quite	common	among	Tunisians	from	many	backgrounds,	my	interest	here.
	11.	 The	stigmatization	of	codeswitching	obviously	represents	a	particular	form	of	(monolingual)	
language	purism.	In	the	West,	it	can	easily	be	linked	to	ideologies	associated	with	standard	
varieties	and	standardization	(e.g.,	Lippi-Green	1997),	themselves	part	of	European	national-
ism	and	its	history,	where	a	people,	a	language,	and	a	land	are	seen	as	indivisible.	From	this	
perspective,	codeswitching	must	be	evaluated	negatively,	whether	the	codeswitcher	is	seen	
as	switching	because	of	lack	of	mastery	of	one	or	both	of	the	languages	or	a	lack	of	loyalty	
to	the	language	(or	nation	linked	to	the	language)	from	which	the	speaker	switches.
	 	 	 A	bilingual	perspective	on	codeswitching	might	question	why	bilinguals,	when	interact-
ing,	would	avoid	switching,	an	approach	pursued	to	some	extent	by	Myers	Scotton	(1993).	
From	this	perspective,	asking	a	bilingual	not	to	codeswitch	when	interacting	with	someone	
who	shares	the	same	languages	and	similar	language	abilities	is	like	asking	an	able-bodied	
person	to	swim	using	only	one	arm	and	one	leg.
	12.	 Worth	considering	is	 the	extent	to	which	such	dichotomies	might	be	a	function	of	human	
perception	and	cognition	and	the	degree	to	which	such	dichotomies	are	encouraged	by	struc-
tural	considerations.	As	noted,	one	of	the	ways	Tunisia	differs	from	its	Maghrebian	neighbors	
is	the	absence	of	a	sizeable	population	of	citizens	who	identify	as	Berber	or	speak	a	variety	
of	the	language.	Thus,	although	one	finds	similar	genderings	of	French	in	Algeria	and	Mo-
rocco,	the	local	details	differ	in	crucial	ways	because	of	the	presence	of	larger	Berber	mi-
norities	and	the	particular	histories	of	each	country.
	13.	 In	a	most	provocative	book,	Abbasi	(2005)	formulated	this	dichotomy	in	terms	of	the	Arabic	
and	French	equivalents	of	“authenticity”	and	“modernity”	(Ar.	hadaatha),	rather	than	“open-
ness”,	noting	 that	 the	distinction	dates	 to	 the	nineteenth	century	 (Abbasi	2005:	43)	while	
Bouhdiba	(1995),	citing	the	writing	of	reformer	Khéreddine	Pacha	(1822–1890),	set	up	the	
distinction	as	one	between	“authenticity”	and	“renewal”	(Ar.	tajdid,	Fr.	renouveau).	Abbasi	
also	often	used	dichotomies	to	explicate	aspects	of	Tunisian	identity,	Tunisian	history,	and	
perspectives	on	both.	Throughout	his	book,	readers	find	clear	direct	and	indirect	evidence	of	
the	robustness	of	these	dichotomies	and	the	ways	in	which	they	continue	to	shape	discussions	
of	Tunisian	identity	in	numerous	ways.	Likely	because	his	concern	is	history	and	historiog-
raphy	as	reflected	in	school	texts	on	Tunisian	history,	he	does	not	mention	issues	of	gender	at	
all.	Thus,	 like	many	historians,	 especially	 earlier	 ones,	 the	historical	 subject	 or	 citizen	 is	
genderless	or	more	likely	assumed	to	be	male.
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	14.	 In	these	cases,	 the	most	dialectal	of	 the	Tunisian	Arabic	terms	used	for	“French”	(adj.)	 is	
souri (as	it	would	be	transliterated	into	French),	the	etymology	of	which	is	unknown.	It	is	
also	the	term	traditionally	used	for	the	French	language;	thus,	titkellem bsouri	translates	as	
‘you	(sg.)	speak	[with]	French’.
	15.	 Cf.	Zamiti-Horchani	(1986)	and	my	discussion	of	it	in	Walters	(1999).	Although	I	fully	ex-
pect	the	percentages	associated	with	categories	to	have	shifted	since	Zamiti-Horchani’s	sur-
vey,	I	would	expect	that	the	social	categories	or	subject	positions	she	described	likely	remain	
in	many	ways	unchanged.
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